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Abstract 
This empirical research is aimed to analyze the development of microfinance principles in 
the lending decisions of the two Chinese formal rural institutions, namely the commercial 
banks and credit cooperatives. For this reason, it is tested if loan purposes are oriented 
towards social goals, and if the guarantee requirements for the farmers are too strict. The 
regression results show that this implementation is only partial. Farmers have to provide 
too strong guarantees that they cannot afford, and this does not allow the great majority of 
them to get access to the credit.  
 
Keywords: Chinese commercial banks; rural credit cooperatives; microfinance; Tobit 
model 
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1. Introduction 
 For centuries, agricultural development has been a popular topic for discussion in 
economic literature. The economists have reached a consensus that rural markets can be 
improved with a proper credit structure. The analysis has been further developed over the 
last decades, along the progressive modernization of the financial system and the 
expansion of microfinance in the developing countries. 
The objective of this empirical research is to analyze the development of the key 
microfinance principles in the lending decisions of Chinese formal institutions. 
Chinese rural market is characterized by a basic dualism consisting of formal and 
informal finance. We commonly refer to the latter as transactions which are unregulated by 
a central authority. In the cases of Chinese villages, the most frequent informal agents are 
relatives and neighbours of the farmers, whilst the two main formal institutions are 
commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives. 
Microfinance is the branch of economic science we commonly refer to as the 
provision of financial services to the economic agents which are generally considered not 
solvent. These actions are aimed to promote economic choices in order to improve social 
welfare and, moreover, to give trust people who actually did not have it, usually just for 
not having any kind of savings. This means that the strong guarantees that may be required 
in normal banking business, and that cannot be afforded by rural households, are not 
requested for getting access to a loan.  
This paper’s literature contribution is a critical analysis of the current microfinance 
development in rural China, based on these two crucial tasks of the loan purposes and 
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guarantee requirements. In order to achieve this goal, the analysis will be performed from a 
database survey gathering personal information of farmers. 
The father of microfinance is a Bengali Professor, Muhammad Yunus: he believed 
that an easy access to the credit was the only way out, for low social class, from their 
frustrating life conditions. This practice is finding a growing interest, in particular among 
economists who not believe in the impossibility of combining together the concepts of 
finance, commonly considered as strictly related with individual profit, with ethics, in this 
case intended as common interest and improvement of social and economic welfare of low 
social class. Nowadays, microfinance finds a general consensus in a wider range, and it is 
developed in several Asiatic countries. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a brief literature review, and in 
section III, after the description of the Chinese institutional setting, two testable hypotheses 
for the empirical research are set up. Section IV, V and VI present respectively of the data 
source, econometric models used, and the economic interpretation of the results obtained. 
Finally, section VII contains concluding remarks of the paper. 
 
2. A brief literature review 
It is well established in economic literature that households in developing countries 
are quite heterogeneous in terms of endowments, production and consumption
1
. Conning 
and Udry (2005) examine rural finance in emerging markets and propose policies in order 
to promote financial intermediation. In a similar study done by Lohlein and Wehrheim 
                                                          
1
 This information is exploited in many empirical researches, and usually used in order to compare rural 
studies across developing countries. 
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(2003), the role of rural credit cooperatives in Russia are observed, suggesting government 
policy options aimed to increase the efficiency of their activity.  
Other important analyses of rural finance markets in Asiatic countries are given by 
Kochar (1997) and Duong and Izumida (2002), respectively for India and Vietnam. The 
results show that individual household information belonging to farmers, such as their 
reputation, actually does affect institutional lending behavior. 
Concerning the asymmetric information issue, that Chinese formal institutions have 
to face,  Akerlof (1970) is the first economist to propose a simple model about it. Through 
his work, he generated a new broad study area. Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) explain 
segmentation into formal and informal markets typically observed in developing countries, 
mainly due to asymmetric information problems and screening costs. Stiglitz (1991) 
discovers that moral hazards and adverse selection have the potential to significantly 
reduce financial market operations and, in extreme cases, generate a complete market 
failure. As we will see through the paper, Stiglitz findings are very appropriate even in 
Chinese rural context. 
In the literature, we also have to take into account studies on rural development 
policies, and credit constraints. Yaron and Benjamin (1997) demonstrate that for a greater 
rural finance development it is much more efficient to promote policies and legal reforms 
than lowering interest rates on loans. Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) show that the 
presence of institutional credit constraints have a large negative impact on the efficiency of 
resource allocation. Furthermore, Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2009) test the efficacy 
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of “village funds”, a recent microfinance program introduced in the rural Thailand: their 
main empirical finding is that it helps in reducing credit constraints.  
Concerning Chinese economic literature, rural credit markets have attracted growing 
studies in particular since the 1990s. Xie (2003) studies the recent reforms of Chinese rural 
credit cooperatives, encountering issues such as rural financial depression. Xiaoshian 
(2005) examines the Chinese regulatory environment for microfinance, recommending 
government policy, in particular related to loan interest rates, aimed to a further 
development. Tongquan (2008) deepens the Chinese legal framework of microfinance, and 
demonstrate that it is not appropriate for the rural growth and prosper. 
Zhou and Zhou (2009) analyze dualism structure in the Chinese market, 
demonstrating that formal and informal finance consist of different lending behaviors and 
guarantee requirements. By studying the impact of informal operations in microfinance, 
Turvey and Kong (2009) provide an interesting description of the relationship between 
Chinese informal and formal finance institutions.  
 
3. Institutional settings and testable hypotheses 
3.1 Institutional settings 
Chinese rural market is generally considered a business with high risk and low profit 
margins. Important problem that commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives have to 
face consists of asymmetric information: this is one of the main reasons why they require 
different conditions than informal finance. These differences concern in particular the 
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guarantee provisions. Empirical studies and surveys (Zhou and Zhou, 2009) show that the 
most common form of a guarantee is a simple verbal agreement. This practice is mainly 
due to the fact that farmers are responsible for maintaining a positive reputation within the 
villages, which is enough to ensure the future repayment of loans. Moreover, the informal 
agents, who in particular are the relatives and neighbors of the farmers, usually tend to lend 
to them in order to give resources for consumption purposes.  
In contrast, a similar structure cannot take place in formal finance, where institutions 
face stronger asymmetric information problems, since in-depth data is in this case required 
by the lenders. As an example, they may experience a situation that puts them in moral 
hazard, having loans requested for entrepreneurial objectives that are turned into 
consumptions. Part of this problem is dealt with by screening farmers that can be classified 
as “the active poor”, meaning that they somehow have an entrepreneurial potential 
regarding the activity. People who are not in this category are unable to receive a loan, and 
microfinance cannot give them assistance. 
For all these reasons, this empirical research will be solely oriented towards the 
analysis of formal institutions. 
 
3.2 Testable hypotheses 
We are going to investigate two crucial aspects that institutions consider when 
making a lending decision: namely, the reasons behind the choices of the borrower 
according to the information available, and the guarantee which is actually required. In 
order to achieve this goal, we set up two testable hypotheses, which will be exploited in 
order to understand whether the lending agents do in fact follow ethical criteria in their 
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actions. 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese rural formal finance institutions lend to farmers in order to 
improve social welfare. 
Lending decision criteria followed by formal institutions depend on several factors, 
including the socio-cultural context of a particular country or environment. One of the key 
questions we may ask is whether Chinese rural institutions consider the non-monetary 
impact of their loans. As it might be in common with other Asian countries, this hypothesis 
is very important since it can lead to a significant issue that does not view profit as the 
primary goal of their lending decision. 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese rural formal institutions do have strong guarantee 
requirements. 
This second hypothesis points out the particular structure of the lending decision 
characteristic of Chinese institutions. Given the high risk in rural markets, we test the level 
of guarantee which has to be provided by the households to the commercial banks and 
rural credit cooperatives. 
 
4. Data source and descriptive analysis 
The database hereby used is provided by a household survey conducted by the 
Tsinghua and HSBC Rural Economic Study Center in Tsinghua University; a total of 4920 
households, in sixteen different regions, have been surveyed. The data gathered contains 
personal situations of Chinese farmers from 2006 to 2008. 
The focus of this study is the loan amount received by each family surveyed 
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respectively from the commercial banks and from the rural credit cooperatives. In Table 1 
it is presented the summary statistics. As we can see, the median of the loan amount among 
the surveyed farmers, for both institutions, is zero Yuan. This means that most farmers 
have difficulties in getting access to the credit. Moreover, other demonstration of the lack 
of the proper credit structure is given by considering the average loan amount of the 
farmers who actually got access to the loan, which is 1469 and 6469 Yuan respectively 
from commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives. Similar average amounts of the loan 
are too low. In fact, as we can see in Table 1, they only represent approximately only 4% 
and 13% of the yearly gross income of the households. 
 
5. Models and variables presentation  
The first results that will be presented are got through OLS regression. In this 
empirical research, we specify this model as follows: 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1
′𝑋1 + 𝛽2
′ 𝑋2 +  𝛽3
′ 𝑋3 + 𝑈 
where Y, the dependent variable, stands for the loan amount received by commercial 
banks and rural credit cooperatives. Then, X1, X2 and X3 are the explanatory variables, and 
represent respectively the information available on the farmers, the purpose of loan and the 
guarantee form provided. Moreover, β1,  β2 and β3 measure the impact on Y respectively of 
X1, X2 and X3, while U is the error term 
Individual information of farmers include their age, gender, years of education, 
number of family members, size of both house and field, production equipment and 
investments, income from field and from doing other business, gross income for the 
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current year. Moreover, belonging to this category are also included some data concerning 
the farmer’s family, such as the age of family leader, the number of family member living 
with the farmer, and whether at least a family member attends school or works outside the 
hometown.  
Purpose of the loan is also a key issue when incurring into a lending decision by the 
borrower. Implications on the institution’s behavior are tested when incurring in loans for 
helping the household in producing, building a new house, finding another work, buying 
clothes and food, electronics or cars, medicals, improving social connections, or for the 
repayment of old loans purposes.  
The third category of variable concerns the guarantee provision. Starting with 
believes declared by the surveyed farmers as loan too costly or to be afraid of loan 
repayment notices (i.e. a raise in interest rates), this category includes whether the farmer 
cannot provide any kind of guarantee, he has not been able to repay old loans, he does not 
have any other possibility of asking elsewhere for a loan, or he is a member of a credit 
union. In particular for the guarantee form, indicators will be if it is a written notice, an 
oral agreement, if collateral is requested, and if the guarantee is provided by a third person 
or by a credit union. 
More detailed explanation of each independent variable may be found in Exhibit 1 in 
the Appendix. 
After OLS regression, the analysis is implemented with Tobit estimator. In this case, 
it is specified as: 
𝑌 =   {
𝑌∗ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1
′𝑋1 + 𝛽2
′ 𝑋2 +  𝛽3
′ 𝑋3 + 𝑈           
       0                                                                                  
if Y*> 0
if Y*= 0
 
P a g e  | 11 
 
 
 
where each variable is defined in the same way as for OLS, with the only exception 
that Tobit model makes the assumption that error term U~(0;σ
2
).  
The reason why the analysis is implemented through Tobit regression is that OLS 
actually may lead to misleading inference, since it ignores the censoring property for the 
data: therefore, with Tobit estimator, the accuracy of our estimations is improved. 
 
6. Results discussion 
Table 2.1 and 3.1 show OSL regression results of the regressions on the loans from 
commercial banks and credit unions respectively. While Table 2.2 and 3.2 are Tobit 
regression results for the two samples.  
Firstly, we examine the criteria followed for the borrower choice, according to the 
available information on the households. Here is where, differently from the loan purposes 
and guarantee requirements, the two institutions present the most remarkable differences. 
As for commercial banks, production equipment and investments have respectively a 
positive and negative impact on the credit access, since their lending decisions are strictly 
linked with the households’ production facilities, and negatively correlated with how much 
a farmer actually produced the year before. As a matter of fact, these two variables are 
significant at 95% and 90% confidence level. Slightly different discourse concerns rural 
credit cooperatives: when lending, they tend to help farmers according to how much they 
produced the year before, compared to their production equipment,  gross income of the 
farmer and income from field of the farmer, that therefore have a negative impact on the 
loan concession. On that we can also assert more sure: these latter variables are all 
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significant at 99% confidence level. 
This means that commercial banks want to help rural households with clear 
unexploited production potentiality, while rural credit cooperatives provide funds to the 
borrowers according to how well they used their resources compared to their endowments. 
This empirical finding lead us a to a very interesting conclusion: even though they adopt 
different criteria for establishing the borrower, once it is chosen, improving household 
production is a very important loan purpose for both formal financial institutions. As a 
matter of fact, production has the strongest significance among all the elements of the 
vector of loan purposes. As we can see in Table 2.2 and 3.2, the Tobit estimator gave us 
very strong values, respectively of 159.42 and 117.70.  
Other relevant loan purpose is the education of kids. The slope coefficients are 
100.02 and 42.69 for commercial banks and credit unions respectively. For this reasons, if 
the most educated person in the family has several years of schooling, the household gets 
easier access to the loan, (in particular for rural credit cooperatives, where this coefficient 
is significant at 95% level). In fact, highest education in the family is the most useful 
screening mechanism that formal institutions have for making sure that loans will be 
actually oriented for financing education. 
Summarizing these first results, we can already assert that our first hypothesis is 
verified, since the loan purposes for funding production activity and education of kids are 
certainly crucial in order to improve social welfare. As we can notice in Tables 2.2 and 3.2, 
these two elements are also significant at 99% level for both institutions. Moreover, also 
the strong significance of the loan for helping farmers in housing (whose coefficients, with 
Tobit estimator, are respectively 136.15 and 45.45) confirms this hypothesis: formal 
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institutions tend to lend for social goals, rather than the personal farmer objective of 
consumption due to a lack of funds. 
Apart from these common points, further discussion can be made by observing how 
commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives present slightly different lending decision, 
concerning the other loan purposes. In fact, rural credit cooperatives do care much about 
profit rather than commercial banks: providing a fund to repay old loans is important, 
while commercial banks prefer, rather than this, to lend for helping farmers to improve 
their social connections. Tobit estimator gives us values for the latter two slope coefficients 
respectively of 69.28 and 127.63, significant at 95% and 90% confidence level. This reason 
may be found in the fact that, as in the case of Russia (Lohlein and Wehrheim, 2003), 
Chinese rural credit cooperatives present a dual nature activity. In fact, they are “self-help 
organizations”, meaning that they must be aimed to participate at the economic life of the 
country, but, at the same time, keeping the orientation to the profit objective. Whilst being 
state-owned, commercial banks activities in rural areas are fully aimed to meet the central 
government policy of support to the agriculture. 
Now, in order to see whether formal institutions have implemented microfinance 
criteria, we have to examine the level of guarantee that they require for getting access to 
the credit. As we can see in Tables 2.2 and 3.2, Chinese farmers have to provide solid 
guarantees. In particular, we can remark the strong significance of the collateral provision 
(whose slope coefficients with Tobit estimator are 131.72 and 84.74 for the two formal 
institutions), and of the belonging to a credit union, which is requested by rural credit 
cooperatives given the slope coefficient of. Enforcing the strength of our results is the fact 
that all these latter elements are significant at 99% confidence level. Moreover, common 
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issue between the two institutions is that they do not accept forms as verbal agreements, 
which are instead typical of informal finance agents (Zhou and Zhou, 2009). Tables 2.2 
and 3.2 show us the negative coefficient for both institutions of the oral agreement, which 
is significant at 99% level. The main reason behind this strict requirement is the necessity 
of avoiding borrowers’ information asymmetries that may generate. Therefore, even our 
second hypothesis is verified.  
As such, we may expand our considerations, in a wider scale, in order to discuss 
further the social welfare improvement. As farmers are a low social class, we can see that 
the lending decision of the formal institutions slightly recalls the basic idea of 
microfinance concerning just for the purposes of the loan. But, due to these strong 
guarantee requirements, it is current opinion that the non-monetary impact, which is basic 
for the microfinance science, is not as relevant as other Asian countries.  
 
7.       Concluding remarks 
In this empirical research, we discovered that Chinese formal institutions have not 
integrated at all microfinance culture in their lending activities. The causes behind this 
implementation, which is only partial, may be found in several factors. For example, rural 
borrowers incur in the same credit constraints as in other countries, with the additional 
limit given by the Chinese transition from a planned into a market economy (Lin, 2004). 
For all these reasons, the farmers are asked to provide a guarantee that they cannot afford, 
which therefore limits their access to credit. 
Even though some improvement over the last years can be noticed, in particular after 
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the 2003 rural credit cooperative reforms, these progresses are not yet appropriate in order 
to pursue an efficient rural development. Perhaps over the next years, with a complete 
expansion of these reform programs nationwide, rural households may have higher 
facilities in the credit access. With a further rural development, farmers, due to their poor 
life conditions, would not be forced to turn the loans for consumption purposes. This 
would lead also to a consequent reduction of social costs, given by the reduction of the 
moral hazard issues. 
Presently, guarantees requested by banks and rural credit cooperatives are still too 
strong. Given the goal of the institution to survive, microfinance cannot lead to the 
instability of the whole financial system. Many economists believe that there in fact is not 
a linear relation between choices aimed to ethic goals and a raise in costs and risks by the 
lending institution. With the implementation of new mechanisms, it might be possible to 
overtake this problem, often considered as a trade-off, between decisions in ethic directions 
and profit maximization. That is why that among the possible solutions that can be 
suggested, there may be the integration of a new culture backgrounds, and consequently 
new procedures within the agents, or the creation of ad-hoc microfinance institutions. Of 
course, we should not forget that it is necessary to have an appropriate legal framework 
aimed to facilitate this integration, which is currently lacking.   
In this way, it would be possible to keep the necessary condition of profitability, but 
at the same time overtaking the historical inefficiency about activities aimed to the ethic 
purpose of improving the welfare of low social class. Through these solutions, 
microfinance culture could be better integrated in the institutions, and the challenge of the 
rural development might be achieved more efficiently in the future. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
loan _comm_banks (in 1000 Yuan) 1,47 0 1000 0 24,80 28,62 962,42 
loan_cred_union (in 1000 Yuan) 6,47 0 3000 0 62,46 35,20 1585,09 
int_age 44,75 45 87 0 14,54 -0,50 0,90 
age_fam_leader 45,97 46 86 0 14,14 -0,90 2,25 
years_educ 7,32 9 90 0 4,14 2,52 53,53 
family_size 4,37 4 19 0 1,70 1,49 6,57 
highest_educ_family 9,14 9 72 0 4,63 0,74 15,63 
prod_equiments (in 1000 Yuan) 23,70 0 10000 0 241,41 29,19 1033,48 
size_house 148,45 100 8205 0 411,59 17,35 326,91 
size_field 9,94 4 705 0 30,74 10,01 141,69 
other_land 0,41 0 305 0 9,66 26,86 755,05 
inc_field (in 1000 Yuan) 5,92 2 400 0 15,01 11,26 213,55 
inc_business (in 1000 Yuan) 7,19 0 506 0 20,08 12,01 237,23 
gross_inc (in 1000 Yuan) 44,17 20 6000 0 182,09 19,74 490,74 
prod_investment (in 1000 Yuan) 10,12 0 3000 0 101,03 20,31 492,52 
 
Note: Dummy variables are not included in Summary statistics 
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Table 2.1: OLS regressions for commercial banks 
 
Model Y= α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+U Y= α+β'1X1+β'3X3+U Y= α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+β
'
3X3+U 
Number of observations 3399  
Dependent variable loan_comm_banks 
int_age -0,042 -0,047 -0,047 
age_fam_leader 0,060 0,058 0,067 
years_educ 0,067 0,069 0,052 
gender 0,628 0,389 0,433 
family_size 0,069 0,097 0,072 
highest_educ_family 0,053 0,043 0,040 
school_elsewhere -0,220 -0,362 -0,207 
work_elsewhere -1,71* -1,508 -1,566* 
prod_equiments 0,014*** 0,014*** 0,014*** 
size_house 0,000 0,000 0,000 
size_field 0,016 0,014 0,014 
other_land -0,010 -0,027 -0,023 
inc_field -0,030 -0,028 -0,033 
inc_business 0,039* 0,042* 0,040* 
gross_inc -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 
prod_investment -0,010* -0,010* -0,011** 
loan_clothing_food -0,596   -0,536 
loan_housing 3,621**   3,998* 
loan_work_elsewhere -0,596   -0,157 
loan_educ_kids 0,161   0,272 
loan_production 3,095***   2,495** 
loan_electronic_cars -2,277   -2,258 
loan_medical -0,426   0,018 
loan_connection 0,116   0,436 
loan_repay_loans -2,098   -3,257 
_cons -1,963     
no_capab_repay_loan   0,234 0,193 
cannot_provide_guare   -1,180 -1,150 
too_costly   -2,189 -2,214 
afraid_loan_notices   -0,326 -1,770 
nowhere_to_borrow   -1,243 -1,176 
member_credit_union   0,494 0,277 
guar_notice   -2,490** -2,702** 
guar_person   5,124*** 4,888*** 
guar_union   1,818 1,088 
guar_collateral   1,853 1,172 
oral_agreeement   -1,479 -1,912* 
_cons   -0,395 -1,086 
R
2
 0,022 0,025 0,029 
 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level;* significant at 10% level  
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Table 2.2: Tobit regressions for commercial banks 
 
Model Y= α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+U Y= α+β'1X1+β'3X3+U Y= α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+β
'
3X3+U 
Number of observations 3399  
Dependent variable loan_comm_banks 
int_age -1,512 -1,805* -1,719 
age_fam_leader 2,074* 1,795 2,525** 
years_educ 2,097 1,415 1,382 
gender 14,388 -1,655 -0,734 
family_size -6,700 -5,323 -7,824 
highest_educ_family 4,192* 4,599** 3,677 
school_elsewhere -24,920 -0,816 -13,800 
work_elsewhere -59,770* -48,979* -49,525* 
prod_equiments 0,117* 0,110** 0,117** 
size_house -0,024 -0,015 -0,015 
size_field 0,088 0,108 0,092 
other_land -0,546 -0,653 -0,488 
inc_field -0,495 -0,574 -0,982 
inc_business 0,488 0,419 0,459 
gross_inc 0,061 0,050 0,076 
prod_investment -0,505 -0,407 -0,530* 
loan_clothing_food -15,636   -24,839 
loan_housing 124,870***   136,152*** 
loan_work_elsewhere 98,137   137,641 
loan_educ_kids 89,897***   100,025*** 
loan_production 190,822***   159,419*** 
loan_electronic_cars -171,413   -187,209 
loan_medical 11,855   17,277 
loan_connection 103,698*   127,628** 
loan_repay_loans -162,295   -139,009 
_cons -580,340     
no_capab_repay_loan   2,949 -23,546 
cannot_provide_guare   -916,750 -1044,349 
too_costly   -1156,152 -1117,595 
afraid_loan_notices   88,962 34,960 
nowhere_to_borrow   -102,537 -86,295 
member_credit_union   -12,466 -17,753 
guar_notice   -50,029* -65,483** 
guar_person   77,822* 63,133** 
guar_union   99,943* 59,608** 
guar_collateral   164,588* 131,717*** 
oral_agreeement   -64,509** -89,115*** 
_cons   -459,041 -535,940 
 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level;* significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.1: OLS regression for rural credit cooperatives 
 
Model Y=α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+U Y= α+β'1X1+β'3X3+U Y= α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+β
'
3X3+U 
Number of observations 3399  
Dependent variable loan_cred_union 
int_age 0,043 0,030 0,053 
age_fam_leader -0,013 -0,011 -0,007 
years_educ -0,167 -0,179 -0,211 
gender 2,616 1,113 1,049 
family_size 0,957* 1,110** 0,965* 
highest_educ_family 0,481** 0,400* 0,411** 
school_elsewhere -2,073 -2,030 -1,705 
work_elsewhere -3,260* -2,872 -2,487 
prod_equiments -0,034*** -0,034*** -0,034*** 
size_house -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 
size_field 0,006 0,007 0,001 
other_land -0,040 -0,076 -0,068 
inc_field -0,100 -0,095 -0,115* 
inc_business 0,050 0,056 0,053 
gross_inc -0,059*** -0,060*** -0,060*** 
prod_investment 0,447*** 0,448*** 0,446*** 
loan_clothing_food -2,903   -2,431 
loan_housing 0,765   -0,014 
loan_work_elsewhere -4,452   -3,089 
loan_educ_kids -1,462   -1,655 
loan_production 10,866***   7,212*** 
loan_electronic_cars 8,925   9,590 
loan_medical -2,289   -1,963 
loan_connection -2,682   -2,791 
loan_repay_loans 26,137***   22,672** 
_cons -5,833     
no_capab_repay_loan   -1,246 -0,569 
cannot_provide_guar   1,703 1,487 
too_costly   0,069 -0,293 
afraid_loan_notices   1,515 -1,149 
nowhere_to_borrow   -1,855 -1,625 
member_credit_union   6,999*** 6,496*** 
guar_notice   -2,154 -2,494 
guar_person   5,095* 3,897 
guar_union   6,752** 4,272 
guar_collateral   22,360*** 20,604*** 
oral_agreeement   0,029 -0,047 
_cons   -5,893 -7,088 
R
2
 0,360 0,372 0,376 
 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level;* significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.2: Tobit regressions for rural credit cooperatives 
 
Model Y= α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+U Y= α+β'1X1+β'3X3+U Y= α+β'1X1+β
'
2X2+β
'
3X3+U 
Number of observations 3399  
Dependent variable loan_cred_union 
int_age 0,633 0,449 0,788 
age_fam_leader -0,622 -0,817** -0,672 
years_educ -0,126 -0,020 -0,419 
gender 28,124*** 10,733 13,398 
family_size 0,536 3,956* 1,571 
highest_educ_family 3,357*** 2,538*** 2,239* 
school_elsewhere -9,391 -4,169 -5,893 
work_elsewhere -6,059 2,042 3,186 
prod_equiments -0,038** -0,031** -0,036*** 
size_house -0,004 -0,004 -0,006 
size_field 0,197* 0,118 0,056 
other_land -0,619 -0,660 -0,537 
inc_field 0,177 0,312 0,132 
inc_business -0,191 -0,195 -0,160 
gross_inc -0,064** -0,085*** -0,076*** 
prod_investment 0,508*** 0,544*** 0,518*** 
loan_clothing_food 23,166   20,084 
loan_housing 44,497*   45,151*** 
loan_work_elsewhere 8,901   18,540 
loan_educ_kids 42,364**   42,691*** 
loan_production 150,346*   117,70*** 
loan_electronic_cars 71,488*   79,643*** 
loan_medical 25,222*   27,727 
loan_connection 8,820   10,676 
loan_repay_loans 74,226*   69,281* 
_cons -273,917     
no_capab_repay_loan   8,472 8,657 
cannot_provide_guar 
 
-24,528 -25,761 
too_costly 
 
0,472 -6,636 
afraid_loan_notices 
 
-12,127 -73,389 
nowhere_to_borrow 
 
-39,048 -43,305 
member_credit_union 
 
65,351*** 60,803*** 
guar_notice 
 
-13,381 -21,783** 
guar_person 
 
71,964*** 58,154*** 
guar_union 
 
108,053*** 71,881*** 
guar_collateral 
 
102,018*** 84,741*** 
oral_agreeement 
 
-17,894** -23,795** 
_cons   -234,373 -285,547 
 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level;* significant at 10% level 
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Appendix 
Exhibit 1: Dependent and explanatory variables 
loan_comm_banks Loan amount by commercial banks (in 1000 Yuan) 
loan_cred_union Loan amount by rural credit cooperatives (in 1000 Yuan) 
int_age Age of the interviewed farmer 
age_fam_leader Age of the family leader of the interviewed farmer 
years_educ Years of education of the interviewed farmer 
gender Gender of the interviewee: 1 if male; 0 if female 
family_size Size of the family people living in the farmer's house 
highest_educ_family Years of education of the highest educated person in the family 
school_elsewhere  1 if a family member is attending school outside the hometown; 0 otherwise 
work_elsewhere 1 if a family member works outside the hometown; 0 otherwise 
prod_equiments Total value of the equipment available for production (in 1000 Yuan) 
size_house Size of the house of the farmer 
size_field Size of the field of the farmer 
other_land Hectares of farmer’s land which is not the field where the farmer is used to work 
inc_field Income of the farmer from the field (in 1000 Yuan) 
inc_business Income of the farmer from doing business (in 1000 Yuan) 
gross_inc Value of the gross income of the farmer (in 1000 Yuan) 
prod_investment Total value of production investment of last year (in 1000 Yuan) 
loan_clothing_food 1 if the farmer requests the loan for clothing and food; 0 otherwise 
loan_housing 1 if the farmer requests the loan for housing; 0 otherwise 
loan_work_elsewhere 1 if the farmer requests the loan for working elsewhere; 0 otherwise 
loan_educ_kids 1 if the farmer requests the loan for making their kids studying; 0 otherwise 
loan_production 1 if the farmer requests the loan for improving their production activity; 0 otherwise 
loan_electronic_cars 1 if the farmer requests the loan for buying electronics; 0 otherwise 
loan_medical 1 if the farmer requests the loan for improving their social connections; 0 otherwise 
loan_connection 1 if the farmer requests the loan for improving their social connections; 0 otherwise 
loan_repay_loans 1 if the farmer requests the loan for the repayment of old loans; 0 otherwise 
no_capab_repay_loan 1 if the farmer believes he will not be able to repay the loan; 0 otherwise 
cannot_provide_guar 1 if the farmer is not able to provide any guarantee; 0 otherwise 
too_costly 1 if the farmer believes the loan is too costly; 0 otherwise 
afraid_loan_notices 1 if the farmer declares to be afraid of bad notices about the repayment of the loan; 0 otherwise 
nowhere_to_borrow 1 if the farmer has nowhere else where borrowing; 0 otherwise 
member_credit_union 1 if the farmer is a member of a rural credit cooperative; 0 otherwise 
guar_notice 1 if the guarantee has the form of a written notice; 0 otherwise 
guar_person  1 if the guarantee is provided by a third person; 0 otherwise 
guar_union  1 if the guarantee is provided by a guarantee union; 0 otherwise 
guar_collateral 1 if the farmer provides a collateral as guarantee; 0 otherwise 
oral_agreeement 1 if the agreement is reached verbally; 0 otherwise 
 
